Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 16
Issue 3 Summer 1983

Article 6

1983

The Japanese Law in English: Some Thoughts on Scope and
Method
Dan F. Henderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Legal Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Dan F. Henderson, The Japanese Law in English: Some Thoughts on Scope and Method, 16 Vanderbilt
Law Review 601 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol16/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

THE JAPANESE LAW IN ENGLISH: SOME
THOUGHTS ON SCOPE AND METHOD
Dan Fenno Henderson*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .........................

II. THE LAW SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT ..................

HII.

THREE KEY PROBLEMS OF COMPARISON

A.
B.
C.
IV.

V.

.............

Concept of Law in Japanese Culture .........
The Role of Law in Japanese Society .........
The Interplay of Law and Language ..........

601
604
607

608
609
611

THE JAPANESE CODE SYSTEM ......................

612

A.
B.

612
614
616

The Civil Code .............................
The Commercial Code ......................

INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN JAPAN ..................

Japanese law is a fledgling topic of comparative law in this
country. The rapid growth of bilateral business and the integration of the United States and Japanese economies in recent years
suggest the need for increased attention to this area. This Article
first examines the prewar antecedents and the postwar developments of Japanese law in English in this country. It then reviews
the present law school environment for the study of Japanese law
as a comparative law subject. Finally, it briefly addresses three
key issues basic to the development of this subject.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Little attention was given to the study of Japanese law in English before 1945 because Japan was viewed as distant and exotic.1 Among foreigners, only John Henry Wigmore 2 and Joseph
* Professor of Law and Director of the Asian Studies Program, University of
Washington Law School. Ph.D. 1955, Berkeley; J.D. 1949, Harvard; B.S. 1944,
Whitman College. Admitted to the Japanese and California Bars.
1. For pre-World War H materials by outstanding Japanese comparativists,
see K. ASAKURA, THE DocuMENTs OF THE IKI (1929); K. ASAKURA, THE EARLy
INsTiTUTioNAL LIFE OF JAPAN (1903); N. HoZUMI, LECTURES ON THE NEW JAPA-
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E. de Becker' wrote major projects of lasting value in English.4
Other useful prewar books and articles appeared occasionally,
but bilingual lawyers in Japan and the United States competent
to read Japanese law and write in English were as rare before
World War II as they are now. Because of their Germanic cast the
Japanese codes are comprehensive, different, and difficult, espe-

NESE CIVIL CODE AS MATERIAL FOR THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
(1912); LEAGUE OF NATIONS Ass'N, COMMERCIAL CODE OF JAPAN: ANNOTATED

(Takayana Gi Kenzi ed. 1931-32).
2. See Henderson, JapaneseLegal History of the Tokugawa Period: Scholars and Sources, in CENTER FOR JAPANESE STUDIES OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 7. (U.
Mich. comp. 1957), which describes Wigmore's early work as:
one of the most remarkable products of Western legal scholarship in Japan
was the English translation of the Minji kanrei ruish-i and the Tokugawa

jidal minji kanreish'i supervised by John Henry Wigmore. Wigmore's
work was carried out in two stages, the first during his stay (1889-1892) at
KeiU University and the second under the sponsorship of the Society of
International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai) between 1935
and 1941. During the first period he translated parts of both the Minfi
kanrei ruish-u and Tokugawa jidai min i kanreish-i and had them printed
with an introduction on Tokugawa institutions as "Materials for the Study
of Private Law in Old Japan," 20 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATic Soc'Y oF

JAPAN, Supplement (1892). It should be noted that this translation of the
Minji kanrei ruish- was from the original Japanese report, while the Japanese printed copy of 1877 is abridged.
In 1935 Wigmore came to Japan for two months at the invitation of the
Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai and organized a team of translators who in the
following six years sent him their translations to be edited in Chicago. By
1941 the translation project was completed. The material translated in this
fashion was organized by Wigmore as follows: Part 1. Introduction; Part 2.
Contract: Civil Customary Law; Part 3. Contract: Legal Precedents; Part
4. Contract: Commercial Customary Law; Part 5. Property: Civil Customary Law; Part 6. Property: Legal Precedents; Part 7. Persons: Civil Customary Law; Part 8. Persons: Legal Precedents; Part 9. Procedure: Legal
Precedents; Part 10. Vocabularies and Indexes.
Id. at 105. See generally J. WIGMORE, LAW AND JUSTICE IN ToKUGAWA JAPAN
(1969) (contains all the translations by Wigmore; except parts 4, 8-B, and 10,
referred to by Henderson, supra).
3. J. DE BECKER, ANNOTATED CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (1909) (reprinted by U.
Pub. of Am. in 1979); J. DE BECKER, COMMENTARY ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE OF
JAPAN (1913) (3 vols.); J. DE BECKER, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE CML
CODE OF JAPAN (1921) (reprinted by U. Pub. of Am. in 1979).
4. Nearly all of the literature, useful and otherwise, in foreign languages on
Japanese law from 1867 to 1973 is listed in AN INDEX TO JAPANESE LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN LANGUAGE MATERIALS, 1867-73 (R. Coleman & J. Haley

comps. 1975).
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cially considering their wholly non-Western setting. Only minor
traces of Anglo-American law had found their way into the Japanese codes before 1945. 5 The minimal interest in Japanese law is
understandable given the United States prewar Atlantic bias and
the European slant of comparative legal studies in the United
States.
Before World War II, neither Wigmore nor de Becker had any
formal support for their study of Japanese law outside of Japan.
In addition, at that time no course in Japanese law was offered in
this country. Even during the Occupation after the war, only a
few United States lawyers familiar with the Japanese law and
language staffed General McArthur's headquarters, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), to assist in certain revisions of Japanese law. Alfred C. Oppler,8 a naturalized American from Germany, was a leading Occupation figure although he
was neither a United States lawyer nor a Japanese linguist.7 One
of the participants most qualified in Japanese law and language,
Thomas L. Blakemore, an Oklahoma lawyer, obtained his Japanese training at Tokyo University after law school before World
War II began. Professor Kurt Steiner,8 another figure involved in
the revisions, completed his legal training in Europe and acquired
a command of the Japanese language at the United States Army
Military Intelligence Japanese Language School at the University
of Michigan and Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Other United States
lawyers with some knowledge of the Japanese language were in
SCAP, but virtually none of them, except Blakemore, had a Japanese legal background. Despite the dearth of Japanese experts on
the staff, many of the reforms they helped institute may be judg5.

See, e.g., 1 MIINPr' (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of

1898, art. 43 (1950) ("a juristic person has rights and duties, subject to the provisions of laws and ordinances and within the scope of its objects as determined
by the articles of incorporation or by the act of endowment"). This statute
originated from English case law regarding ultra vires. Takenuchi, How Should
We Abolish the Ultra Vires Doctrine in CorporationLaw?, 2 LAW IN JAPAN: AN
ANNUAL 140, 143 (D. Henderson trans. 1968); see also Kitagawa, Damages in

Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 3 id., 43, 56 (D. Henderson, L. Hurvitz & K.
Sono trans. 1969); 3 MIIa'- (Civil Code) art. 416 (1950) (embodies the principle

of Hadley v. Baxendale).
6. Oppler was the Chief of the Courts and Law Division in the Government
Section of SCAP.
7. See A. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN (1976).
8. See Steiner, Postwar Changes in the Japanese Civil Code, 25 WASH. L.
REv. 286 (1950).
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ed a success, especially in constitutional law and related areas."
After World War II, selected United States legal institutions
were introduced into the Japanese system, but the basic civil law
orientation of the system remained unchanged. In some fields,
however, the influence of United States legal concepts was
profound; the impact of United States constitutional law was especially strong.'0 For the first time, the Japanese Constitution became justiciable law. Although several major regulatory statutes
covering antitrust, securities regulation, and labor relations were
modeled after United States statutes, 1 the Japanese practices
under these statutes became uniquely Japanese. Major amendments to the Civil Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were
required to reflect constitutional changes, such as provisions
favoring equality of the sexes and protecting suspects. 2 Many revisions were made in the Commercial Code to comport with
United States law on shareholders' rights in corporations. Lesser
revisions were also adopted for the Criminal Code and the Code
of Civil Procedure. Overall, reforms during the Occupation (19451952), although important, were probably not as influential in
creating interest in Japanese law in the United States as was the
recent emergence of Japan as a leading manufacturing and trading partner.

H.

THEn LAW SCHOOL ENVMONMENT

Law schools and faculties have an important role to play in
stimulating student interest in Japanese law. By establishing new
specialized programs of study, the law school can create a
favorable environment for the study of the Japanese legal system
and thus affect the overall awareness of the Bar in this area.
For many years, Japanese law had no place in United States
law schools and received little attention from practitioners. After
9. For views concerning the need for constitutional revision, see J. MAKI,
PAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
10. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FrST TWENTY

JA-

YEARS, 1947-67, (D. Hen-

derson ed. 1969).
11.

E.g., Yushutsu nyu Torihiki Ho (Export and Import Trading Act), Act

No. 299 of 1952 (patterned after United States antitrust laws), partially reprinted in 3

ORGANIZATION

FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, ch. J (1973).
12. See LEGAL REFORMS IN JAPAN DURING Tru ALLIED OCCUPATION

(collection of seven articles from 23-27 WASH. L.

REV.).

(1977)
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1945, the Bar and United States law schools began to show an
increased interest in Japanese law. Prior to 1962, the activities in
this area centered on the collection of Japanese legal materials by
libraries and the instigation of legal exchange programs. Harvard,
the University of Washington, and several other law schools began in this period to acquire and maintain Japanese law books. In
addition, the University of Washington published several articles
covering important postwar legal reforms in the Far Eastern Section of the Washington Law Review. 13 A significant legal exchange program which spurred activity to acquire knowledge of
Japanese law was the Ford Foundation's sponsorship of Japanese-American Program for Cooperation in Legal Studies. The
law schools of Harvard, Michigan, and Stanford exchanged scholars with Japanese law schools. As an outgrowth of the program,
the exchange participants became leaders in kindling further interest in the area. Another product of the program was the publication of a useful, multiauthored volume surveying various Japanese law topics. 14 In addition, United States professors, judges,

and lawyers sporadically visited Japan and occasionally published
articles in English about their experiences.
Comparative law in general plays a minor role in specialized
educational institutions such as United States law schools because of the practice-oriented outlook of law students. A comparative law course must compete with all of the other perspective
courses such as international law, legal history, and jurisprudence.
In order to attract students who by necessity are more inclined to
enroll in "bar examination-oriented" courses of study, the university must offer comparative law courses that emphasize both the
professional and practical aspects of the subject area. Japanese
law is but one area of comparative law and is a relatively new
entrant in the field. These conditions help to limit comparative
law courses in many law schools to a single survey course that
contrasts the Anglo-American common law with the civil law of
France and Germany. As a general rule, the comparative studies
programs have not emphasized the professional problem-solving
approach to substantive private law, a focus essential to a transPacific practice.
13.

See 23 WASH. L. REv. 151 (1948) to 27 id. 85 (1952), reprinted as LEGAL

REFORMS IN JAPAN DURING THE ALLIED OCCUPATION (1977).
14. See LAW IN JAPAN, THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING

Mehren ed. 1963).

SocIETY (A. von
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Substituting Japan for France or Germany as the model for the
"civil law" legal system may rectify the general academic orientation of comparative law courses and thereby engender more student interest in Japanese law. There are several arguments that
support this change: (1) the materials are available in English; (2)
Japanese law is arguably more important to the practicing bar
than either French or German law because Japan has a much
greater economic and business impact on the United States; (3)
Japanese law may have more potential for intellectual contrast
because of sharper differences in tradition and culture; and (4) it
is "civil law," though sui generis.
Courses on international transactions 5 can be restructured to
orient the student to the realities of international commercial
practice. International or transnational transactions courses provide information on the laws of other countries, United States
law, and occasionally international law, and equip the future lawyer with the skills to handle these transactions. Because most
transactions confronting the legal practitioner are bilateral in nature, it is desirable to obtain a specialization in the pertinent laws
of two significant trading countries. International transactions
courses should mirror the realities of practice and should not try
to include the laws of a variety of countries that deal with United
States parties. Not enough law of any one country can be taught
in such courses to be of much practical value. A bilateral approach to an international transactions course, such as United
States-Japanese Transactions, is more appropriate for professional needs. This realization prompted the University of Washington to establish a LL.M. and Ph.D. program in United StatesJapanese Legal Transactions. 6 In a post-J.D. program of this in15. Approximately 250 law professors teach such a course. AEmAc ASs'N.
LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 1982-83, at 882-85 (1982).
16. The essential assumptions of the program are:
(1) There is a need in both countries for practicing comparativists who are
knowledgeable in both United States and Japanese law. It is unsound to
presume to practice in such a specialty without a facile competence in

both English and written Japanese.
(2) Entering students are assumed to have taken an introductory J.D.
course on the Japanese or American legal system.

(3) Candidates must be trained in the law of their own country and be
knowledgeable of the Japanese language.

(4) The content of the program is bilateral in orientation and will focus on
the problems of United States-Japanese transactions for practicing

JAPANESE LAW IN ENGLISH
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tensity, it is possible to grasp substantive law issues on a professional problem-solving level.
In addition to the establishment of the doctoral program in
United States-Japanese Legal Transactions, the University of
Washington School of Law in 1962 appointed a full-time, tenured
specialist in "Asian" law to develop a comparative law program
based on "non-Western" sources.17 Japanese law is a major emphasis of the program and a coordinated set of six courses in Japanese law is offered annually to both J.D. and LL.M. students
interested in the program.' 8 Individual courses in Chinese law, Indonesian law, Islamic law, and Korean law"9 are also available.
The overall grasp of Japanese law in the United States legal community should improve measurably as graduates continue to take
places in the profession and the publications on Japanese law
accumulate.2 0
III.

THREE KEY PROBLEMS OF COMPARISON

Issues relating to the concept of law in the culture, the role of
law in the society, and the interplay of law and language must be
confronted when investigating the law of a country as different as
Japan. These issues become more acute in comparative jurisprudence because of the foreign language component. Any comparativist researching English translations of Japanese law must con-

lawyers.

(5) Six courses are taught in English from course materials developed at
the University of Washington and containing relevant United States, in-

ternational, and Japanese legal sources in translation. The advanced
courses for each quarter are: (1) Justiciability in United States-Japanese

Disputes; (2) United States-Japanese Contract and Sales Problems; (3)
United States-Japanese Corporate Relations; (4) United States-Japanese

Tax Problems; (5) Japanese Administrative Law; (6) Government Regulation of Business in Japan. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF LAW,
1982-83 BULLETIN 39-40 (1982) [hereinafter cited as U. WASH. SCH. L.
BULLETIN].

17. This writer was the appointed professor. Our interest was initially supported by a Ford grant at the end of 1961, which was to be devoted to "nonWestern" law. We were, of course, aware that "Asian law" was hardly a rigorous
term either, and for us it meant that our law school intended to base our "comparative law" on law from Asian, rather than European, sources.
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
19. U. WASH. ScH. L. BuLLETN, supra note 16, at 38-39.
20. See, e.g., LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL (U. Wash. Sch. L. pub. 1967-date)
(currently in its 15th vol.).
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front these critical issues whether his interest is macrosystemic or
microdoctrinal, and whether his focus is directed toward
academia or legal practice.
A.

Concept of Law in Japanese Culture

First, the idea of law itself must be examined.21 Until the creation of the Great Court of Cassation in 1875, Japan had nothing
resembling an independent judiciary, no tradition of justiciable
law, and no separation of the judiciary from the administration.
Even after 1875, the new courts handled only ordinary civil and
criminal cases. Under the Meiji Constitution, which had become
effective in 1889, a single administrative court with only token
jurisdiction was established to hear administrative law cases.2
Essentially, the political administration remained above the
"law." When the new constitution took effect after World War II,
the ordinary courts were empowered to hear all suits against administrative agencies as well as suits involving the constitutionality of legislation. The brief experience of only a century of justiciable law in civil cases and roughly thirty-five years in
administrative and constitutional litigation has an important
message for comparativists, especially in Japan where traditional
social controls have been extraordinarily refined. Indeed, the
traditional Japanese society was rule-ridden and behavior was
minutely prescribed by society, not justiciable law.
Whatever one's position may be on the usefulness of distinguishing domestic "law" and "administration," or "custom" and
"justiciable law" (or "law," "justice," and "politics"), it is misleading and confusing for comparativists to use, without stipulating definitions, the terminology of United States justiciable law
(e.g., court, judiciary, bar, bench, appeal, trial) when discussing a
system without an independent judiciary. In addition, these terms
must be used carefully in a discussion of a system having a brief
and superficial experience with justiciable law to avoid exaggerat21. The "east-west" contrast in the Japanese approach to "law" has been
discussed at length by F.S.C. Northrup, Joseph Needham, and many others. For

recent discussion of the literature, see T. STEPHENS, A COmPARATMV STUDY OF
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE "IDEA OF LAW" INTO CHINA, JAPAN AND INDIA

(1978) (a

M.A. thesis done at Brisbane, Austl).
22. This new administrative court had only token jurisdiction. See Wada,

The Administrative Court Under the Meiji Constitution,10 LAw
ANNUAL 1, 21-25 (1977).

IN

JAPAN: AN

JAPANESE LAW IN ENGLISH

Summer 1983]

ing the role of law. These words are value-laden for the English
language reader and inevitably will attribute important characteristics to a system unless the entire legal culture is clearly
explained.
After 1947, Japan formally committed to a constitutionalism
similar to that of the United States and provided for judicial review of legislative and administrative acts by the ordinary courts.
Because this tradition is of a relatively recent origin and the
courts' review is not often used, the role of justiciable law remains
correspondingly shallow. In many areas, Japan has employed nonlegal alternatives in social ordering. The United States comparativist must be careful not to assume too readily that these alternative ways are somehow primitive and inferior.
B. The Role of Law in Japanese Society
For historical reasons, even today the role of law in Japanese
society is minimized. As used here, the word "law" has a special
meaning: it connotes "justiciable law" or "lawyer's law," which
implies a verbalized written rule, typically a statute, enacted by a
legislature representing voters. This law is justiciable because a
plaintiff can obtain a favorable judgment by filing a suit in a
court, following proper procedures, and proving his claim by a
preponderance of acceptable evidence. If the decision is not appealed or otherwise overturned, the plaintiff then may have that
judgment executed through the courts and receive his remedy
from the "law." An independent, impartial judge qualified in the
law, notice of the fair hearing (due process) to the parties, observance of proper procedural steps, and access to a trained and licensed lawyer are crucial- to the successful operation of justiciable
law.
The apparatus of "justiciability" is rather unique, at least in
the degree to which it is used in the United States. It was first
imported into Japan only about a hundred years ago. This new
alien system of law has been superimposed on a highly unusual
society. Isolated from the world for two centuries, Japan became
a decentralized system of small feudal domains, each made up of
largely self-governing village communities of confucianistic family
unity.2 This kind of society produced a homogeneous, highly im23.

For a capsule presentation of the pre-modem system in the Tokugawa

era (1600-1808), see 1 D.

HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AN

JAPANESE LAW: ToKu-
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mobile, collectivistic people, normally dependent on each other
(within the family and the village) for their entire lives. Most
community matters were settled communally without a formal
"court." If the annual taxes were paid by the village to the overlord, who in turn paid tribute to the Tokugawa Shogun, the villagers were left alone in their dealings with each other.
Although the intricacies of this unique and isolated system cannot be fully explained in this Article, the significant feature to
note is the decentralized mode of governance delegated from the
Shogun coupled with the extreme density of society at the extremities of the village. Behavioral patterns, registries, and written rules and records were precise. On the whole, compliance by
the Japanese people was remarkable because it was self-imposed
by their own small, closed communities.
The Japanese people may not be described appropriately as
"law-abiding" because the controls were more socially ingrained
and enforced by immobility and communal adhesion than affected by external law. In the home, workplace, and neighborhood, behavior was so socially prescribed and enforced that stateimposed law was not only absent but quite superfluous in private
dealings. It is critical for lawyers to understand that today Japan
is still socially disciplined to a remarkable degree.
Despite the country's technological inferiority when opened to
the west by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853, Japan was already quite sociologically advanced, indeed quite "modern," if
modern means adaptable to the rigors of late twentieth century
industrial productivity. The workplace has become what the Japanese wryly call the "second village" because livelihood, welfare,
and success in life depend on performance in the same workplace
with the same people, ideally for an entire career. This concept of
the workplace accounts for the immense corporate dedication of
Japanese employees. Today, their ability to focus social energy on
the task of improving corporate productivity to compete with rival corporations is incomparable. Japanese competitors also have
a strong tendency to group together against foreign businesses.
During the hundred years of experience with imported western
justiciable law, the Japanese have developed a sophisticated central bureaucracy, a system of administration, and a structure of
private law based on imported codes. The legal literature proGAWA AND MODERN, chs. 2-3 (1965); Hiramatsu,
PAN: AN ANNUAL 1 (D. Henderson trans. 1981).

Tokugawa Law, 14 LAw IN JA-
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duced in this period -

treatises, commentaries, and case law - is

voluminous, systematic, and refined. The mix of social and legal
institutions, however, remains subtle and elusive to the comparative lawyer with little exposure to Japanese society.
C.

The Interplay of Law and Language

The third problem of the comparative method is the relationship of language to law. The language problem is both subtle and
complex for the comparativist because of the difficulty of the Japanese language and the inherent parochialism of monolingual lawyers. If the foreign law is in another language and the lawyer is
monolingual, he can hardly understand the nuances presented by
the problem. The lawyer easily may suppose that "law" and its
major concepts are quite platonic; that is, extant "things" in the
real world to which his language assigns names. By equating fuh-o
koi, keiyaku, and bukken with English torts, contracts, and property, respectively, a lawyer could assume that he is in command
of Japanese law and capable of applying it to his client's problem.
This type of lawyer tends to be a chronic, unthinking "word substitutionist," who must obtain the assistance of the comparativist
lawyer to avoid making irreparable errors.
As noted, the relationship between law and language is inherently imperfect even within a single system. In a Japanese comparative law practice, however, the difficulties of law and language inevitably are compounded by the problem of translating
from a language, society, and culture as different as that of Japan.
The best way to approach the law/language problem in comparative law is by reviewing the problem first in the relatively simple
setting of the United States judicial process. The term "interpretation" designates the many meanings that lawyers can find in
any rule that is applicable to their particular case. On the other
hand, "application" designates the single meaning of the law that
is ultimately fixed in the court's holding.24 Interpretation is the
product of the client's interests, multiplied by his lawyer's ingenuity in using and abusing language. Multiple meanings are a
normal quality of the abstract language used in statutes. Lawyers
do not cause the interpretational malady suffered by a statute,
they only exploit its symptoms.
24. See Henderson, Japanese Law in English: Reflections on Translation,6
J. JAPANESE STUD. 117, 120 (1980).
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The rule of law and judicial process, which embody the interpretation and application problems accruing from the inherent
imperfections in language, are now parts of a political value system embraced by both the United States and Japan. A modicum
of understanding of the imperfections of technical language in a
single legal system is but a first step for the comparativist working with Japanese law in English. Translation of laws from Japanese to English (or vice versa) compounds the problems of legal
ambiguity. Even a simple description of a Japanese legal system
in the English language is inevitably a comparative law study because foreign terms must be used to describe the Japanese concepts which exist only in Japanese law. Legal translation, being
such a description, is necessarily a comparative law exercise.
Translation of Japanese law into English requires sensitivity to
structural and conceptual differences in the civil law and common
law systems, as well as an awareness of the peculiarities of Japanese legal culture and the uses of law in Japanese society.
IV.

THE JAPANESE CODE SYSTEM

A.

The Civil Code

Japan has an elaborate systematic code law originally derived
from German and French models. The hierarchy of legal authorities used to interpret the code law is quite different from that of
the United States. Precise terminology, specified in the Civil
Code, runs throughout the Japanese system of private law, including the Commercial Code and the Code of Civil Procedure.
Understanding and using the discrete code provisions without
prior grounding in the system is risky.
The Codes are convenient once the whole system is learned. A
Japanese lawyer normally can obtain a working solution to a legal
problem by referring to the materials organized by code sections.
The solution can be discovered in the Codes and related cases in
a fraction of the time it takes to find an answer in the lawless case
law of the United States, which is often accessible only through
use of the "key-less, key-word" indices. 25
25. Given the flood of reported cases since his time, we can smile in appreciation of J. Story's words in 1821: "The habits of generalization ... will do
something to avert the fearful calamity which threatens us of being buried alive,
not in the catacombs, but in the labyrinths of the law." J. Story, Progress of
Jurisprudence,in MISCELL ANEOUS WRITINGS 237 (1852).

Summer 1983]

JAPANESE LAW IN ENGLISH

Two standard topics of the usual law school course on comparative law are especially relevant to Japanese Code law. The first is
the hierarchy of Japanese legal sources. The second is the systematic nature of Japanese Codes and their comprehensive coverage.
Both topics are routine to comparativists because they are fundamental structural features that affect the application of codes in
any civil law system. The meaning of any part of the Japanese
Codes is influenced by its legal source hierarchy and the nature of
its coverage. This dualism, however, can be overlooked easily by
common law lawyers reading an isolated section in translation.
The systematic character of the Codes makes it doubly difficult to
render them intelligible in translated secondary sources. The Japanese author writing for a Japanese audience assumes a background that his English language reader may not possess. The
necessary background is often too massive to supply in the form
of footnotes or interstitial comments, but the Japanese insistence
on comprehensive coverage and structural symmetry often makes
any section considered alone incomprehensible without the
proper conceptual background. This conflict contributes to the
shortcomings of the translated secondary sources. Furthermore,
Japanese law in English has additional problems not encountered
in Japanese law in Japanese.
In most civil law countries, the civil code is subject only to the
constitution. 6 In a sense the civil code stands as a dictionary, its
General Provisions (s-osoku) providing grammar and vocabulary
for the whole system in civil matters. For example, a sharp contrast exists between Japanese and United States property law. In
Japan, the Civil Code,27 subject to the Constitution,2 controls all
rights of ownership: "No real right can be created other than
those provided for in this Code or in other laws."'29 No property
rights, therefore, exist outside the statutory law. In the United
States federal system, however, property law is the creature of
state law. Each state's property law is derived from statutes,
precedents, and concepts of feudal tenure which can be traced to

26. See LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 346-405 (D. Henderson & J. Haley
eds. 1978).
27. 2 1hNP5 (Civil Code) arts. 175-398 (1950).
28. 3 KENro Constitution art. 29 (1947).
29. The Civil Code states: "No real right can be created other than those
provided for in this Code or in other laws." 2 MN1'
(Civil Code) art. 175 (1950).
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an English common law heritage. The Eibun Horei-sha (EHS) 30
translation of article 175 of the Civil Code is slightly misleading
3 1
in using the term "real right" for bukken (rights-in-things).
"Real right" may cause monolingual lawyers to think of real estate as a platonic category instead of a common law ethnocentricity. Bukken includes both "real estate" (fud-san or immovables)
and personalty (dsan or movables).
B. The Commercial Code
As compared to the Civil Code, the Japanese Commercial Code
is "special law," meaning that it is first applicable to the
problems within its scope. When problems are not covered by the
Commercial Code, the more basic Civil Code applies unless there
is some applicable customary law. For example, under the Civil
Code,32 some juristic persons (hojin) are controlled by Commercial Code provisions concerning private interest juristic persons
(eiri-hujin).Public interest juristic persons (kieki h-jin) are governed by the Civil Code. To determine the juristic status in Japan
of a United States partnership, 3 one should consider, pursuant to
the Civil Code, 4 whether a Japanese treaty3 5 supplements the
Commercial Code definition of private interest juristic persons
30. EHS is a useful compendium of translations of the major codes, statutes,
and regulations.

31. See supra note 29.
32. 1 MIN76 (Civil Code) art. 35 (1950).
33. The "foreign companies" (gaikoku h'Sjin) of 1 Mmn' (Civil Code) art. 36
(1950), include United States corporations but not partnerships (not juristic persons). Japanese law does not have "partnerships" in the United States sense.
Civil partnerships (kumiai keiyaku), id. art. 667, are similar but still quite different. Japanese "partnership corporations" (gshi gasha and gmei gaisha) are
not like our partnerships because they have a juristic personality.
34. 1 MINPi (Civil Code) art. 35 (1950).
35. "As used in the present Treaty, the term 'companies' means corporations, partnerships,companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit." (emphasis added). Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
art. XXH(3), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2079-80, T.I.A.S. 2863. Article VII(1) provides for
national treatment of foreign companies, id.; however, the effect of the treaty
provision on partnerships, especially the effect of 1 NNO (Civil Code) art. 36(1)
(1950), is controversial among Japanese commentators. See Ryoichi, 75-yaku ni
yoru gaikoku h'Sjin no ninkySp, 57 KOKUSAiHo GAmi 138, 161 (1958); Miyatake,
Foreign Companies in U.S.-Japanese Business Corporation Law 77 (M. Tatsuta
& D. Henderson eds. 1977) (U. Wash. mimeo).
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and includes our kind of partnerships within the concept of sh-oji
gaisha (trading companies). By only examining the Commercial
Code 6 on this issue, a United States attorney may overlook the
possibility that United States partnerships might also be affected.
37
The Commercial Code has its own General Provisions
(svosoku) in Book I which may govern significantly those corporate
matters presented in Book II. For example, a recent Supreme
Court decision, Fuji Rinsan K'ogyo K.K. v. Kiso Kanzai Shibai
Kyo-do Kumai,3 8 illustrates the interconnected nature of the Commercial Code.39 Fuji Rinsan K'ogyo K.K., a corporation, sold all of
its assets to a cooperative, but the cooperative did not take over
the business activities of the transferor. The transferor, Fuji, sued
to repudiate the transaction on the grounds that the sale had not
been approved by a two-thirds vote of its shareholders, as required by the Commercial Code.40 "Sale of assets," "business
transfer," and "merger" transactions are major corporate changes
that must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the shareholders
and must provide dissenters the right to sell their shares at an
appraised value.4 1 Before the post-World War IEamendments, a
business transfer (eigyo jodo) was defined narrowly in the General Provisions4 2 of the Commercial Code to cover only those
transactions in which the transferee had assumed the activities as
well as the assets of the transferor. The court applied this narrow
definition of a business transfer in its consideration of article 245,
Shareholder Approval for a Business Transfer. The Supreme
Court, in a nine to six decision, decided that shareholder approval
36.

SnoHi

(Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 482 (1899), states:

"[a] company which establishes its principal office in Japan or the chief object of
which is to carry on business in Japan, shall, even though incorporated in a
foreign country, comply with the same provisions as a company incorporated in
Japan."
37. SHkH- (Commercial Code) arts. 1-51 (1899).
38. Fuji Rinsan Kogy5 K.K. v. Kiso Kanzai Shibai Ky-od Kumai, 19 Sai-han
minshii 1600 (1965). See T. Shibukawa, Various Problems of Sale of Corporate
Assets 24 (1979) (U. Wash. mimeo).
39. The Japanese Commercial Code amendments of 1951, including the
provison involved here (art. 245), were patterned after United States corporation
law, especially the Illinois statute. See Blakemore & Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions, 2 AM. J. Comp. L. 12 (1953).
40. SHkHi (Commercial Code) arts. 245, 343 (1899).
41. See, e.g., 2 AmicAN BAR ASS'N., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED §§ 78-80 (1971).
42. SHHO (Commercial Code) arts. 24-29 (1899).
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was not required because the transferee did not take control of
the business activities, and allowed the sale to stand.
The requirement of shareholder approval was inserted in the
Commercial Code in 1950,. under the influence of United States
law. A United States lawyer reading article 245 alone may not
have anticipated the result in Fuji. He probably would expect
that shareholder approval of the sale would be required as in
United States law, based on the assumption that the whole purpose of importing article 245 from the United States into the
Code was to protect dissenting shareholders against headstrong
directors. In addition, the United States lawyer probably would
not understand the meaning of eigyo j'odo in articles 24 through
29, which protects transferees from transferor competition. This
case illustrates the influence of the system on Japanese
interpretation.43
The laws of checks 44 and promissory notes 45 (commercial paper) are "special law" to the Commercial Code. The Code of Civil
Procedure, 4 6 with many "special laws" of its own, is the enforcement auxiliary to all of the civil law, but is dependent on the Civil
47
of the defendant, for
Code in many ways. The general forum

example, is determined by his domicile (jusho), a term which is
defined in the Civil Code,'48 not in the procedural law.
V.

INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN JAPAN

International litigation often focuses sharply on law/language
issues. Regardless of which law governs, one party is always working with translated foreign law. When United States-Japan business issues are considered, the law inevitably is utilized to provide
a common ground of interaction.' 9 In some fields, for example in
taxation, both Japan and the United States are subject to the
same treaty law.5 0 The rationality that law provides is particularly
43. See, e.g., Fuji Rinsan Kogyo K.K. v. Kiso Kanzai Shibai Kydo Kumai,
19 Sai-han minshii 1600 (1969) (Matsuda, J., dissenting).
44. KoGrrE-0, Law No. 57 of 1933.
45. TEGATA-HO, Law No. 20 of 1932.
46. MINJI SOSHO HO (Code of Civil Procedure), Law No. 29 of 1890.
47. 1 MINJI SOSHO HO (Code of Civil Procedure) art. 2 (1890).
48. 1 MINO (Civil Code) art. 21 (1950).
49. See D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 291 (1973).
50. Convention on Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1972, United States-Japan, 23
U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365.
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useful for interaction between foreigners because their domestic
business lacks a common social milieu. This reliance on justiciable law in international business contrasts with the relatively
shallow dependence on the Codes in local transactions by the
Japanese themselves. 51
In litigation the first question is always: which law governs the
issues in dispute? As a result of complex differences in the United
States and Japanese laws of jurisdiction,52 the plaintiff may have
an option to sue in either country, an option which may make the
difference between victory or defeat because the same law may
not govern in the courts of both countries.
If foreign law governs in a United States court, the translated
English versions of Japanese statutes, cases, and commentaries
are necessarily the materials which the English-speaking judge
uses to discover the content of the applicable Japanese law. Parties often attempt to prove that their versions of the foreign law
are valid by offering English versions of the Codes, and if needed,
their own expert witness to interpret them. 53 In important cases,
both parties use their own experts who give differing interpretations of the law. The differing expert opinions pose problems for
the judge, who lacks the language competence necessary to find
the correct interpretation on his own." In this context an extraordinary stress is placed on the translated law; a single mistranslated word may result in victory or defeat.
Clarity is elusive in an English language discussion of Japanese
Code concepts that are seldom identical to comparable United
States legal concepts. Bilingual litigation is the ultimate form of
the law/language problem in United States-Japanese comparative
law methodology. Anyone concerned with the practical aspects of
this type of litigation will soon be disenchanted after a few court
experiences.
Several years ago, some rather technical rules concerning res
judicata were nearly misapplied in a California court case because
51. See D. HENDERSON, supra note 43, at 161.
52. For comparisons of United States and Japanese laws of jurisdiction, see
Fujita, JapaneseRules of Jurisdiction,4

LAW iN JAPAN:

AN ANNuAL 55 (1970); 1

Justiciability in U.S.-Japanese Disputes, ch. IV (D. Henderson & Y. Fujita eds.
1970) (U. of Wash. mimeo).
53. See Henderson, Proof of Foreign Law, in 2 Justiciability in U.S.-Japanese Disputes, ch. VIII (1970) (U. of Wash. mimeo).
54. See id. In Japan, the problem of the adversary "expert" is avoided by the
court's appointment of a single expert after hearing suggestions from the parties.
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of an EHS mistranslation of a critical word, shubun, as "text"
instead of "order" or "holding." The summary below briefly discusses the typical lawyer-related problems in the case presented
by the differences between the civil law and common law doctrines of res judicata55 (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel
(issue preclusion).
The California suit was Farmland& Development Co. v. Toho
Co. Ltd.5s Hachitsuka (Farmland) and Yonemoto (Toho) had

planned to export a United States film for showing in Japan.
Hachitsuka, believing that Yonemoto had promised to obtain the
necessary license for importing the film into Japan, bought
through Farmland the rights to show the film in Japan for
$14,000. Yonemoto, however, was unable to acquire the import license in Japan and the whole venture failed. Hachitsuka, having
allegedly lost $93,000, sued Toho Corporation and Yonemoto in
California on two separate legal theories: (1) breach of contract;
and (2) tort (deceit). Yonemoto fied suit in Tokyo 57 to obtain a

declaratory judgment" absolving him of tort liability and damages. Although he pleaded to negate the tort claim, Yonemoto
failed to seek negation of the contract liability. Two independent
suits, based on the same grounds and seeking opposite results,
were pending on each side of the Pacific.
The Tokyo court found no tort liability and duly rendered a
judgment that Toho was not liable to Hachitsuka in tort. The
California action, however, sought damages on two theories, contract and tort, a key difference that determined whether the Japanese judgment for Toho precluded Hachitsuka's later California
recovery. Because the Tokyo judgment was handed down before
the trial in California, Toho lawyers asserted the Tokyo judgment
as a res judicata defense to the California suit. The question was
55.

See Comment, Litigation Preclusion in Louisiana: Welch v. Crown

Zellerbach Corporationand the Death of CollateralEstoppel, 53 TUL. L. REv.
875 (1979) (an apt example because Louisiana, a civil law (or mixed) state, requires a comparison of common and civil law differences).
56. No. 69-2762 (Los Angeles, Cal. Super. Ct. 1968) (no opinion was filed,
thus the summary provided in the text is from the author's files).
57. Toho Inc. v. Hachitsuka Chieko, 16 KakyU minshii 923 (1965), reprinted
in 11 JAPAN ANN. INT'L L. 197 (1967) (English trans.).
58. In a declaratory action (kakunin sosho) seeking negative relief, the person who is normally the defendant becomes the plaintiff by requesting a declaration that he is not liable. See generally D. HENDERSON & T. HATTORI, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, ch. 7 (1983).
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whether judicially determined facts underlying the Japanese tort
judgment estopped Farmland from making contrary assertions in
the contract claim in California.
Pursuant to California law, a foreign (Japanese) judgment bars
the tort claim by res judicata and a previously litigated "fact"
(here, no promise by Toho) necessary to such a judgment bars the
contract claim by collateral estoppel. The California court, applying its choice of law rule, found that it must apply Japanese law
and give the Japanese judgment the effect it would have had as a
Japanese judgment under Japanese law. The critical question for
the contract claim became: is there a doctrine of collateral estoppel (sotenko) in Japanese law?
To determine the scope of a declaratory judgment and the existence of collateral estoppel in Japanese law, the California court
heard conflicting expert testimony on provisions of the Japanese
Code of Civil Procedure. The English translation (EHS) of the
pertinent provision of the Code, although clear, is a bit awkward:
"As far as the matters contained in the text of a judgment which
has become final and conclusive are concerned, they have res
' 9 Because the findings of fact are included in the pubjudicata."
lished text of the court's opinion, res judicata (kihanryoku) seemingly would result under the pertinent Code section. This, however, is not the law in Japan. The word "text" in the English
translation is the EHS "English equivalent" for the Japanese
word shubun. The shubun, which makes no findings of fact, is
only a short order as opposed to the full text of the court's opinion. In this case the shubun read: "[I]t shall be confirmed that
the plaintiffs [Toho and Yonemoto] are under no obligation to
compensate for damages amounting to $93,000 due to the torts
set forth in the annexed list.... The expense of the suit shall be
borne by the defendant." 60
Under California law, Japanese law may be proven by expert
witnesses. To ascertain the meaning of the applicable Code of
Civil Procedure section, Toho, the California defendant, offered
the English translation of the section quoted above through his
expert witness. The expert stated that the Code provision should
be interpreted to give effect to the facts underlying a Japanese
judgment. Although this is a view held by some professors in Japan, it is not Japanese law. The Supreme Court of Japan consist59.

EHS § 199.

60. Toho Inc. v. Hachitsuka Chieko, 16 KakyI

minsh u 923 (1965).
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ently has refused to yield to the criticisms of several excellent
young scholars and, following the opinion of Kaneko Hajime and
other older scholars, has declined to make "collateral estoppel" a
part of Japanese law.
This author was the plaintiff's expert on Japanese law at the
California trial and had great difficulty opposing the defendant's
expert. The California judge naturally tended to favor the expert
interpretation which was similar to California's own collateral estoppel practice. By finding that the EHS translation of shubun
was misleading and reviewing the supporting court cases and the
writings of Professor Kaneko, the judge properly limited the effect of the Japanese judgment and held that the judgment barred
only the tort claim by res judicata. The plaintiff was then given
the opportunity to submit evidence of the contract.
This complex case illustrates the emphasis placed on legal language in litigation and the problems encountered when a language foreign to the law must be used to bridge two different legal systems. In bilateral lawsuits between Japanese and United
States persons, genuine ambiguity frequently persists until the
court actually speaks.

